

THE WILL IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: JULY 1–2 2002

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

MONDAY JULY 1ST

- 10.00 – 11.00: Registration**
- 11.00 – 12.30:** David Owens (University of Sheffield) – ‘The Authority of Practical Judgement’
- 12.30 – 1.30: Lunch**
- 1.30 – 3.00:** Richard Moran (Harvard University) – ‘The Agent’s Perspective and What Happens’
- 3.00 – 4.30:** Tom Pink (King’s College, London) – ‘Freedom and Causation’
- 4.30 – 5.00: Tea**
- 5.00 – 6.30:** David Velleman (University of Michigan) – ‘What Good is a Will?’
- 6.30: Scottish Enlightenment Walk**
- 8.30: Reception and Dinner**

TUESDAY JULY 2ND

- 9.30 – 11.00:** Gideon Rosen (Princeton University) – ‘Responsibility and Moral Ignorance’
- 11.00 – 12.30:** Christine Tappolet (University of Montreal) – ‘Value Judgements and the Will: Neo-Sentimentalism’s prospects’
Sarah Stroud (McGill University) – ‘Moral Reasoning and Moral Principles’
- 12.30 – 1.45: Lunch**
- 1.45 - 3.15:** Richard Holton (University of Edinburgh) – ‘The Reality of the Will: Considerations from Philosophy and Psychology’
- 3. 15 – 4.45:** Alison McIntyre (Wellesley College) – ‘Resolution, Revision and Weakness of Will: Practical Rationality as the Infrastructure of Autonomy’
- 4.45 – 5.15: Tea**
- 5.15 – 6.45:** Alan Millar (Stirling University) – ‘Is Intention a Normative Concept?’
- 7.00: Dinner**