This is the web page for the free will lectures given by Richard Holton as part of the honours course Moral and Political Philosophy, at Edinburgh University, 2002-3. The main aim of this page is to provide lists of readings, together with links to those that are available on-line. In addition it provides links to copies of the handouts, and some tutorial topics. If you have suggestions for things that might be posted here, please let me know by emailing me at richard.holton@ed.ac.uk

Links to articles here are provided through the JSTOR database. To get them you will need to use a machine that is licenced to access that database. Any machine that is operating through a University of Edinburgh server should work. Journals available include The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Mind, Nous, Philosophical Perspectives,The Philosophical Quarterly and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. There is a 'moving wall' system employed: only issues more than five years old can be obtained.

Photocopies of articles marked with an asterisk (*) are available on reserve in the Psychology and Philosophy Library.

Also on reserve are four books:

Collections

    Gary Watson. (ed.), Free Will. Held in the Main Library. Most of the standard modern papers, and a good introduction. This book is also available from James Thin (Blackwells) for those who want to buy it.

    John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. A more recent collection. Some overlap with Watson, but also some more recent papers; especially good on discussions of Frankfurt cases. Held in the Psychology and Philosophy Library
Monographs

    Susan Wolf, Freedom within reason. Complex compatibilist position in terms of responsiveness to reasons. Not quite as easy to read as many of her articles. Held in the Psychology and Philosophy Library.

    R. Kane, The Signiicance of Free Will. Complex libertarian position. Held in the Psychology and Philosophy Library.



Lecture One

The standard vocabulary. Two causes of concern: phenomenology and responsibility. Frankfurt on why responsibility doesn't require 'could have done otherwise'. The classical compatibilist position

Readings

Handout I in acrobat format.



Lecture Two

Frankfurt on freedom and higher order desires.

Readings

    Harry Frankfurt Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971) (Frankfurt's original account)

    *Harry Frankfurt 'Identification and Wholeheartedness' (1987) in his The Importance of What We Care About; reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza. (Frankfurt's later account.)

    *Harry Frankfurt 'The Faintest Passion' (1991) in his Necessity, Volition and Love. (Frankfurt's most recent thoughts, somewhat different to the account in the preceeding article)

    G. Watson 'Free Agency' in G. Watson (ed.) Free Will (Watson's criticisms of the early Frankfurt position)

    D. Velleman 'What Happens When Someone Acts' Mind 1992 (Criticism of the idea that choice is the mark of identification)

    *T. Scanlon, 'Reasons and Passions' in Contours of Agency , edd. S. Buss and L. Overton (Discussion of whether the actions and states we have chosen are those for which we are morally responsible, and of whether the account of first-order desires is convincing.)

Handout II in acrobat format.



Lecture Three

Libertarian solutions

Readings

    *Richard Taylor, Metaphysics Chapter 4, 'Freedom and Determinism'

    Randolph Clarke 'Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will' Nous 27 (1993)

    Robert Kane 'Two Kinds of Incompatibilism' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989) Kane's position is presented in greater detail in his book, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford University Press 1996), on reserve in the Psychology and Philosophy Library.

    For a nice discussion of Lewisıs distinction between plain and contrastive explanations, see P. Percival, 'Lewisıs Dilemma of Explanation under Indeterminism Exposed and Resolved' Mind 109 (2000). Percival actually doubts that contrastive explanations are impossible in indeterministic cases. But the kind of explanations that he envisages (those that explain how the likelihood of an indeterministic event can be changed) seem unlikely to be of much use to Kane.

Handout III in acrobat format.



Lecture Four

Strawson on the Reactive Stance

Readings

    *Peter Strawson 'Freedom and Resentment'

    *Gary Watson 'The Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme'

    Susan Wolf, 'The Importance of Freewill' Mind 90 (1981)

Handout IV in acrobat format.



Lecture Five

Other directions for compatibilism

Readings

Handout V in acrobat format.





For Lecture Six

Freedom as a political ideal

Readings

    Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty, on reseve in Psychology and Philosophy Library.

    On Mill: Robert Young, 'The Value of Automony', Phil Quarterly (32) 1982 JSTOR

    On Kant: *Thomas Hill, ' The Kantian Conception of Autonomy'


    Handout VI in acrobat format.





    Handout VI in acrobat format.





    Tutorial Topics

    1. How pressing are our reasons for wanting to believe in free will? Mightn't we just be wrong about it? What is really at stake here?

    2. Does freedom require the ability to do otherwise?

    3. Does Strawson's account help us to accommodate freedom?

    4. Is there a coherent libertarian position?

    5. Is the political ideal of freedom the same as that required for freedom of the will?